INTRODUCTION
In the field of Internet policy, 2011 has been the year of privacy. Congress has introduced six bills related to online privacy, 1 and the Obama administration released two major reports recommending greater federal oversight of online markets. 2 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) appears poised to step up regulatory activity on this front. 3 State--level activity is also percolating, led by California, which floated two major bills recently. 4 These efforts would expand regulatory oversight of online activities in various ways. Some measures would institute Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPPS), governing the collection and use of personal information online. 5 Others would limit some types of data collection, ban certain data or advertising practices, or create new mechanisms to help consumers block online ad--targeting techniques. Another measure would mandate websites adopt a so--called Internet
Eraser Bu sites and services.
Concerns about c
are an important part of this debate. The Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) already mandates certain online--privacy protections for children under the age of 13. The goal of COPPA was to enhance parent involvement in their children
The FTC is currently considering an expansion of COPPA, 6 and lawmakers in the House of Representatives introduced legislation that would expand COPPA and apply additional FIPPS regulations to teenagers.
While well--intentioned, efforts to expand privacy regulation along these lines would cause a number of unintended consequences of both a legal and economic nature. In particular, expanding COPPA raises thorny issues about online free speech and anonymity. 9 Ironically, it might also require that more parental--consent provisions. There are better ways to protect the privacy of children online than imposing burdensome new regulatory mandates on the Internet and online consumers. Education, empowerment, and targeted enforcement of unfair and deceptive practices represent the better way forward.
THE COPPA REGIME
COPPA is a complicated and somewhat open--ended law and regulatory regime. COPPA requires that commercial operators of collecting, disclosing, ation) of children under the age of t they have actual knowledge that they are collecting personal information from a child.
Congress delegated broad authority to the FTC to devise and enforce the COPPA rule. The FTC nt. 10 This approach allows sites that might collect personal information to use a mix of methods to comply with the law, including print--and--fax forms, follow--up phone calls and e--mails, credit card authorizations, and the use of encryption certificates. Th operated by private companies that help website operators comply with COPPA.
COPPA EXPANSION & TH
In recent years, some states have proposed expanding the COPPA regime in various ways. 11 These efforts would expand the COPPA parental--consent framework to include all minors up to the age of 18, broadening the range of sites covered, increasing the amount of information , some combination of these. None of these reforms have been implemented yet. ine. It would apply FIPPS regulations to teenagers via a Digital Marketing Bill of Rights for Teens and also impose limits on collection of geolocation information from both children and teens. The bill would also mandate sites create Eraser Buttons, a concept modeled loosely on a similar idea being considered in the European Union, a so--. Specifically, the bil mechanisms that permit users of the website, service, or application of the operator to erase or otherwise eliminate content that is publicly available through the website, service, or
In essence, eraser buttons would help minors wipe out embarrassing facts they have placed online but later come to regret.
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PROBLEMS WITH COPPA AND ITS EXPANSION
The influential child safety group Common Sense Media (CSM) floated some of the regulatory proposals discussed above in a report released December 2010. 16 It is understandable why some policymakers and child--safety advocates like CSM would favor such steps. They fear that there is too much information about kids online today or that kids are voluntarily placing far too much personal information online that could come back to haunt them in the future.
These are valid concerns, but there are both practical and principled concerns with the regulatory approach embodied in the Markey--and COPPA expansion efforts. In the name of protecting privacy, expanding regulation might actually undermine it. This makes it clear that the FTC does not regard the methods it has adopted for obtaining parental consent under COPPA as the equivalent of strict age verification.
The FTC understands that no age--verification technology is foolproof. Even credit cards, the most common method used to verify parental consent, cannot always be trusted to verify a parent--child relationship. Although credit cards may seem the most robust tool for verifying parental consent essentially, age verifying the parent federal courts have found, in rejecting the constitutionality of the Child Online Protection Act (COPA) used to verify age because minors under 17 have access to credit cards, debit cards, and --card issuers usually will not issue ther ways in which a minor may obtain and use
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B. Threat of Mandatory Age Verification for All Users
First, it is unclear how an expanded COPPA regulatory regime would work without requiring mandatory online age verification of all Internet users, which would raise serious constitutional issues. To verify the relationship between a parent and a minor when a take--down request is received, a more sophisticated identity--authentication scheme is required. A previous effort to age--verify users, the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), was found to violate the First Amendment and also to raise different privacy concerns.
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Federal courts found that there is age--verification services or products available on the market to owners of websites that actually reliably establish or verify the age of Internet users. Nor is there evidence of such services or products that can effectively prevent access to w 21 In January 2009, after a decade--long court battle over the constitutionality of COPA, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the federal likely dead.
There are many other concerns about age--verification mandates.
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A 2008 report produced by the Internet Safety Technical Task Force (ISTTF), a Harvard--based blue ribbon task force assembled by state Attorneys General to study this issue, found that:
Age verification and identity authentication technologies are appealing in concept but challenged in terms of effectiveness. Any system that relies on remote verification of information has potential for inaccuracies. For example, on the user side, it is never certain that the person attempting to verify an identity is using their own actual identity or someone system that relies on public records has a better likelihood of accurately verifying an adult than a minor due to extant records. Any system that focuses on third--party in--person verification would require significant political backing and social acceptance. Additionally, any central repository of this type of personal information would raise significant privacy concerns and security issues. 23 Internet security expert Bruce Schneier has similarly outlined the dangers of going down this path: t work. Any design of the Internet must allow for anonymity. Universal identification is impossible. Even attribution knowing who is responsible for particular Internet packets is impossible. Attempting to build such a system is futile, and will only give criminals and hackers new ways to hide.
Implementing an Internet without anonymity is very difficult, and causes its own problems. In order to have perfect attribution, we'd need agencies real--world organizations to provide Internet identity credentials based on other identification systems: passports, national identity cards, driver's licenses, whatever. Sloppier identification systems, based on things such as credit cards, are simply too easy to subvert. We have nothing that comes close to this global identification infrastructure. Moreover, centralizing information like this actually hurts security because it makes identity theft that much more profitable a crime. Moreover, Schneier ttempts to banish anonymity from the Internet .
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The COPPA regime partially dodged some of these problems by limiting its coverage to kids age 12 and under and stopping short of mandating strict age verification. Sites covered by COPPA are geared to small children and have very limited functionality or social networking capability. This makes them easier to identify and regulate. older minors and all websites, however, the Markey--Barton bill and state--based COPPA expansion efforts would convert COPPA into a variant of COPA by necessitating expanded age verification of all sites and users to be effective.
C. Raises Unforeseen Privacy & Security Issues
Ironically, another problem with these efforts is that expanding COPPA would require the collection of more personal information about kids and parents. For age verification to be effective at the scale of the Internet, the collection of massive amounts of additional data is necessary.
Who will collect, process, and retain all the data collected to verify ages, identities, and relationships? As the ISTTF noted of age--ny central repository of this type of personal information would raise significant privacy concerns and security issues.
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Such databases would present an attractive target for hackers and scam artists. Recent data--breach incidents highlight the dangers of excessive data collection by companies.
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Age--verification mandates would force companies to expand datasets about individuals during a time when many privacy advocates and security experts are encouraging data minimization instead.
D. Free Speech Rights of Teens in Play
There are also important free speech rights in play in these debates, including the rights of teens. While the First Amendment rights of teens are not on par with those of adults, they do have the right to access certain types of information and express themselves in certain ways. Collecting information and learning from serious online sites clearly has great value to children. But teens also benefit from being able to participate in online interactions. As a recent MacArthur Foundation study of online youth Internet use concluded:
Contrary to adult perceptions, while hanging out online, youth are picking up basic social and technological skills they need to fully participate in contemporary society. Erecting barriers to participation deprives teens of access to these forms of learning. Participation in the digital age means more than 29 Finally, practically speaking, it is unclear whether it would be sensible to expect parents to verify their children for every website they wished to visit. For example, it seems like overkill and certainly an annoyance to require parental verification before a 17--year old can access The New York Times website or ESPN.com. Yet, a strict reading of the Markey--Barton bill and some state--based COPPA expansion efforts would require such parental verification. That might also encourage many older teens to lie about their age and seek to circumvent the regulations, which could and into less visible and less safe sites and forums.
PROBLEMS WITH THE ERASER BUTTON CONCEPT
The concept raises many of the same practical and principled concerns as COPPA.
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A. Conflict with the First Amendment
First, an Eraser Button mandate could conflict with free speech rights and press freedoms. 
B. Security Issues
The Eraser Button concept also raises security concerns. Is there an ironclad way for sites to request? Mandating the creation of eraser buttons would, ironically, require an identity verification system that would be used for potentially even more sophisticated online than we see at work today.
An Eraser Button could open dangerous backdoor vulnerabilities to hackers or others with malicious intentions. Teens often share a great deal of personal information (including passwords) with friends and family members, which could lead to a disastrous scenario if others request deletion of information that should not be theirs to control.
C. Complexities Associated with Shared Content
Shared content also presents problems for the Eraser Button concept. Many photographs, blog posts, or social networking entries include multiple people and are copied and reposted on multiple sites (and often archived). Facebook says users submit around 650,000 comments on the 100--million pieces of content served up every minute on its site. 
D. Conflict with 47 U.S.C. §230 Section 230
The Eraser Button concept could also lead to a flood of bogus takedown requests. Every blogger could conceivably be asked at any time to delete any comment on any post ever written if someone does not like the commentary written online about them. If that occurs, an Eraser Button mandate would be in conflict with . ter service shall be held liable on account of any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected; or any action taken to enable or make available to information content providers or 47 U.S.C. Sec. 230(c)(2).
intermediaries have generous leeway to determine what content and commerce travels over their systems without the fear that they will be overwhelmed by lawsuits if other parties object to some of that content.
Online speech and commerce would likely be severely stifled if not for the broad immunities granted by Section 230. For example, user--sites and services would have been less likely to develop as rapidly or robustly as they have.
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The Eraser Button concept would contradict the spirit of Section 230 and lead to confusion about what types of content must be taken down versus what could remain online without fear of liability. If the threat of liability encourages site administrators to begin removing massive amounts of content or blocking communications and social networking functionality, the chilling effect on the free exchange of views/information would likely be quite profound.
CONSTRUCTIVE ALTERNATIVES TO REGULATION
S and COPPA expansion efforts are understandable, but there is a superior framework for dealing with these concerns. Educate and Empower would address problems far more effectively and safely than the Legislate and Regulate approach.
Personal and parental responsibility must be part of this discussion. Education is the key and parents are the first line of defense, but schools, companies, and other institutions also have a role. This mentoring includes media--literacy courses efforts aimed at encouraging better social norms. 36 They should also be encouraged to delete unnecessary online information occasionally.
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The FTC hosts a collaborative effort with other federal agencies , represents a savvy approach to raising awareness about various online threats.
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Many companies and trade associations are also taking steps to raise awareness among their users about how they can better protect their privacy and security. Other non--profits including many privacy advocates offer instructional websites and videos explaining how privacy--sensitive consumers can take steps to protect their personal information online.
Companies also have an important role to play in creating --lit neighborhoods ne where kids will be safe. Online operators should also be careful about what (or how much) 35 The Greatest of All Internet Laws Turns 15 Forbes, May 8, 2011, http://blogs.forbes.com/adamthierer/2011/05/08/the--greatest--of--all--internet--laws--turns--15. information they collect especially if they primarily serve young audiences. Most widely trafficked social networking sites and search engines already offer a variety of privacy controls. And accounts can always be deleted.
Many excellent online safety and privacy--enhancing tools already exist for parents and teens to better safeguard their online privacy.
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A host of tools are available to block or limit various types of data collection, and every major web browser has cookie--control tools to help users manage data collection. Consider some of the privacy--enhancing tools and systems already available on the market today:
Ad preference manager 40 Microsoft, 41 and Yahoo! 42 all offer easy--to--use opt--out tools and educational web pages that clearly explain to consumers how digital advertising works. 43 Meanwhile, DuckDuckGo offers an alternative search experience that blocks data collection altogether. 44 s, which allows users to available as a menu ), 45 , 46 ). 47 Firefox also has many add--ons available that provide the functional equivalent to stealth mode or offer additional functionality. 48 CNET News.com You can set Mozilla Firefox, Microsoft Internet Explorer, and Google Chrome to clear out and block the cookies most online ad networks and other Web trackers rely on to 49 Users can also take advantage of many supplemental tools and add--ons to better protect their privacy online by managing cookies, blocking web scripts, and so on. Like the marketplace for parental--control technologies, a remarkable amount of innovation continues in the market for privacy--empowerment tools, so much so that it is impossible Meanwhile, for $4 to $8 per month, information from various websites or data--collection services. 63 Adblock Plus, which lets users block advertising on most websites, is the most downloaded add--on for both the Firefox and Chrome web browsers. 64 As of June 2011, roughly 125 million people (roughly 86,000 per day) had downloaded the Adblock Plus add--on for the Firefox web browser. 65 Incidentally, both Adblock Plus and NoScript, the third most popular download on Firefox, support the Do Not Track protocol. 66 Finally, pressured by the FTC and privacy advocates, all three of the major browser--providers Microsoft, 67 Google, 68 and Mozilla 69 have now agreed to include some variant of a Do Not Track mechanism or an opt--out registry in their browsers to complement the cookie controls they already offered. These developments build on industry----regulatory 70 to make opting--out on targeted advertising simpler. A collaboration of the leading trade associations in the field announced that effort last Fall. They include: American Association of Advertising Agencies, American Advertising Federation, Association of National Advertisers, Better Business Bureau, Digital Marketing Association, Interactive Advertising Bureau, and Network Advertising Initiative. 71 ed advertising and gives consumers an easy--to--use opt--out option. It was accompanied by an educational initiative, www.AboutAds.info, which offers consumers information about online advertising. 72 The independent Council of Better Business Bureaus will enforce compliance with the system. Empowerment efforts such as these have the added advantage of being more flexible than government regulation, which tends to lock--in sub--optimal policies and stifle ongoing innovation.
What these developments illustrate is a well--functioning marketplace that is evolving to offer consumers greater control over their privacy without upending online markets or destroying the quality of the browsing experience. It would be difficult exists when such a robust marketplace of empowerment tools exists to serve the needs of privacy--sensitive web surfers.
Just as most families leave the vast majority of parental control technologies untapped, many households will never take advantage of these privacy--enhancing empowerment tools. 73 That fact does not serves proof of What matters is that the tools exist for those who wish to use them, not the actual uptake/usage of those tools. 68 the Bureau of Consumer Protection at the FTC, found that advertising rates are significantly higher for behaviorally targeted ads, with the average return on behaviorally targeted advertising being just over twice that of other advertising. The reason that greater return on investment is important, Beales notes, is because:
Advertising using behavioral targeting is more successful than standard run of network advertising, creating greater utility for consumers from more relevant advertisements and clear appeal for advertisers from increased ad conversion. Finally, a majority of network advertising revenue is spent acquiring inventory from publishers, making behavioral targeting an important source of revenue for online content and services providers as well as third--party ad networks. 80 This illustrates how more effective advertising can cross--subsidize and sustain online content and culture. More and better advertising means more and better content and services will be made available to consumers. Beales concluded his study by noting, the financing mechanism that makes online content and services possible as well. As content traditionally provided offline (such as newspapers) continues to move to the Internet, the link between online advertising and content is likely to become increasingly vital to the provision of 81
CONCLUSION
Thus, expanding COPPA or imposing solutions like an Internet Eraser Button will have a deleterious economic impact on Internet companies and online consumers. Those who call for expanded regulation should be required to provide a strict cost--benefit analysis of the r COPPA expansion or an Internet Eraser Button mandate will raise serious free speech concerns. In particular, limitations on the collection and reporting of facts about individuals could come into conflict with press freedoms and raise First Amendment issues as a result.
COPPA expansion could also give rise to unanticipated privacy problems. In the name of more information about minors and their parents since ages and identities would need to be strictly verified.
Parents and guardians and costly regulatory schemes. The key to that process is education and empowerment of parents and minors alike. Targeted law enforcement efforts can also play a role at the margin when unfair and deceptive practices are shown to exist. 80 Ibid., 1.
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Ibid., 18.
